info@truex-consultancy.com
Findings library
CriticalChapter 6 18 Aug 2026

Retested before anyone investigated

Quality control: OOS results not investigated in accordance with procedure

What the inspector wrote

An assay result of 88.2% (specification 95.0 to 105.0%) for batch 7702 was obtained on 3 May. The sample was re-prepared and re-injected the same day, giving 97.1%, which was reported on the certificate of analysis. No laboratory investigation was opened until 9 May, after the batch had been certified. The original result was not referenced in the batch record.

Cited against EU GMP Chapter 6, 6.35 and 6.36; PIC/S PE 009 Part I, Chapter 6

Why it was cited

This is the classic 'testing into compliance' pattern and regulators treat it as a data integrity issue, not a laboratory error. Once a failing result exists, the only acceptable next step is a documented Phase I investigation. Retesting first, then investigating, means the retest was chosen to make the problem go away.

Reporting only the passing result compounds it: the batch record now misrepresents what the laboratory knew at release.

What would have prevented it

  • A procedure that makes any retest or re-preparation after a failing result impossible without an open, numbered investigation.
  • Analyst training that treats an OOS as a stop signal, with supervisors reinforcing it rather than pushing for a result.
  • Audit trail review that specifically looks for re-injections and re-processing on the same sample within a short window.

Written from the deficiency categories published by EU and UK regulators. Details are illustrative and do not describe a specific named site.

More findings

MajorChapter 1 15 Sept 2026

'Human error' accepted as a root cause, again

Investigation of anomalies: inadequate root cause analysis

Deviation DEV-24-0187 concluded that the root cause was operator error and the CAPA was retraining of the operator concerned. The same failure mode had been recorded in three previous deviations in the preceding fourteen months, each with the same conclusion and the same corrective action. No assessment of contributing factors, procedure design or equipment had been performed.

Read the breakdown
MajorChapter 1 8 Sept 2026

The impact assessment that stopped at the batch

Deviation handling: impact on other batches not evaluated

A temperature excursion in cold store CS-02 was recorded as a deviation against batch 4471 only. Twelve other batches of four products were stored in CS-02 during the excursion window. No assessment of impact on these batches was performed and two of them were subsequently certified and distributed.

Read the breakdown
MajorChapter 4 1 Sept 2026

Shared logins on a GMP system

Computerised systems: data integrity, access control

The chromatography data system in QC laboratory 2 was accessed using a shared account 'QCLAB' whose password was known to all analysts. Electronic signatures applied under this account could not be attributed to an individual. The audit trail showed 214 result approvals under the shared account in the review period.

Read the breakdown